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The Al l For Austral ia League in New South Wales
A Study in Political Entrepreneurship and Hegemony
GEOFFREY ROBINSON
In 1931, the All for Australia League and other ‘citizens movements’ mounted a major
challenge to the established conservative parties. Traditional views of the League saw it as
a reflection of economic group interests, whether of the business establishment or dissident
capitalists such as manufactures. More recent scholarship has stressed middle-class
concerns with ‘sound finance’ as the inspiration of the League. This paper instead situates
the League in the historical context of centre party projects in New South Wales, and of
progressivism, in particular industrial psychology. The economic crisis and the rightward
shift of the nationalists enabled a group of political entrepreneurs to transform the
League from a front group for business into a populist movement. However, the shift
of mainstream conservatism back to the political centre fatally undercut the
League’s support base.
Introduction
During 1931, the Nationalist and Country Parties were challenged by an upsurge
of populist citizens’ movements: the All for Australia League (AFA) in New
South Wales and Victoria, the various ‘country movements’ in New South
Wales, and the Citizens’ League in South Australia. Like the German Nazis at the
same time or One Nation recently, these movements of the alternative right
directed a torrent of populist rhetoric against mainstream conservatism, but in
Depression-era Australia they soon faded from the scene.
In this article, I examine the career of the All for Australia League in New
South Wales from its formation in February 1931 to the February 1932
convention at which it merged with the Nationalists to form the New South
Wales division of the United Australia Party (UAP). I draw on the largely
unexamined collection of League materials in the papers of League activist and
former Labor parliamentarian Thomas Mutch. I question both the contending
traditions in Australian political historiography: the traditional approach that
has seen political mobilisations largely as a reflection of group interests; and the
‘Melbourne school’, represented recently by Judith Brett, that has emphasised
the importance of values and political discourse in the construction of group
identity. Early scholarship on the Depression-era ‘alternative right’ identified
these movements as the vehicle of economic interests, either just another
example of business conservatism, or the representative of groups unrepre-
sented by orthodox conservatives such as small manufacturers or the petty
bourgeoisie. In Brett’s analysis, the League’s discourse, more specifically that of
My thanks are due to Trevor Matthews for discussions on the topic of this paper, two anonymous
referees for their comments, and to Stuart Macintyre and Lisa Hay for reading the manuscript.
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the League’s hero Joseph Lyons, is described as a brilliant reformulation of
middle-class morality.1
The analysis here seeks to transcend both approaches. Political parties under
capitalism, as Nicos Poulantzas argued, are the parties of a class society, but
individual parties do not directly represent class interests. Political activity
revolves around the pursuit of specifically political goals*above all, access to
the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. Political parties are created by
political entrepreneurs who seek to attract votes and members. The long history
of Australian minor parties demonstrates that at any given time there will
always be political entrepreneurs, but whether their creations attract a market
depend on factors beyond their control. Recent scholarship on the pre-1945
European populist right has stressed that such movements were not simply
puppets of dominant elites and that their success and failure cannot be explained
without close attention to individual political conjunctures.2
Centre party dreaming
From 1910 to 1930, successive political entrepreneurs in NSW launched new
centre parties in opposition to both Labor and the established conservatives.
These parties appealed to such forgotten people as farmers, Protestant workers,
the ‘middle-class’, returned soldiers, or just ‘moderates’. Proponents of centre
politics called for class harmony and national unity, but their strategies diverged.
One approach, exemplified by the League, emphasised personal and moral
reform and the encouragement of enlightened citizenship rather than class
interest; the other more pragmatic tradition, best represented by Billy Hughes,
looked to a balancing of self-interest under corporatist political leadership. In the
latter tradition, arbitration and the tariff were central instruments of political
management, but the former viewed with suspicion the appeal to self-interest.
The immediate antecedents of the League lay in two distinct political projects,
one from the right wing of the ALP and the other from Theosophy.
In 1927, several state Labor MPs were driven out of the party by Premier
Jack Lang and his union allies. At the 1927 state election, two were re-elected as
independent Labor candidates: H. V. Evatt and the former Education Minister,
1 T. Matthews, ‘The All for Australia League’, in The Great Depression in Australia, ed. R. Cooksey
(Canberra: Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, 1970), 13637 (unfortunately, the
thesis on which this article was based is no longer extant); J. McCarthy, ‘‘‘All for Australia’’: Some
Right Wing Responses to the Depression in New South Wales, 19291932’, Journal of the Royal
Australian Historical Society 57, pt. 2 (1971): 160171; J. Brett, Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle
Class (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7, 14, 10015; P. Cochrane, Industrialization
and Dependence: Australia’s Road to Economic Development (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press,
1980), 126.
2 N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: NLB, 1975), 191. The concept of political
entrepreneurship is adapted from Richard Valelly’s Radicalism in the States: The Minnesota Farmer-
Labor Party and the American Political Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). G. Eley,
Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1998); M. Mann, Fascists (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004).
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Thomas Mutch. Mutch went on to play a leading role in the League. In early
1930, some ex-Labor rebels formed the Parliamentary Reform Movement. Its
President was Peter Board, former state Director of Education from 1905 to
1922, but two 1927 Labor rebels and a former Labor senator served on its
executive. The Movement’s draft platform proposed the abolition of pre-
selection, a non-party cabinet, revision of the Commonwealth Constitution,
and ‘peace and efficiency in industry’. The Movement marked the first entry of
the 71-year-old Peter Board into party politics. Board was a pioneer of the ‘new
education’ that sought to supplant a narrow vocationalism by an emphasis on
training for citizenship, with particular focus on the social integration of
working-class male youth. Board believed that universal education could
encourage the social mobility of talented individuals, within limits, and thus
blur lines of class division.3
Four years on from Lang’s purge of 1927, some of his victims, in particular
Thomas Mutch, played a leading role in the All for Australia League, but the
League’s more direct predecessor emerged out of Theosophy. In the 1920s,
Theosophists initiated a program to ‘theosophise Australia’; initiatives included
the 1926 formation of radio 2GB in Sydney and the establishment of a political
monthly, Advance! Australia, which mixed specific Theosophist enthusiasms with
praise of Mussolini’s decisiveness and the virtues of Australian-made goods. In
November 1929, the Sydney theosophist A. E. Bennett formed the Who’s For
Australia? League. The League and Bennett demanded that Australians unite in
love of country, but from month to month they took contradictory positions on
issues such as tariff levels or the Niemeyer mission. Bennett transcended these
contradictions with moral appeals; for example, Australians should resolve
voluntarily not to purchase imports rather than look to ‘unscientific’ tariffs.4
In 192930, the ex-Labor rebels swam against the leftward tide of public
opinion that swept Labor to power at the national and state levels. Their efforts
were overshadowed by those of Billy Hughes, first as a rebel independent
Nationalist at the 1929 election and then as founder of the Australian Party,
which contested the October 1930 state election on a broadly pro-Labor
platform. Hughes initially found that a rival political entrepreneur, Sydney
barrister Richard Windeyer, had staked out a claim to the political centre ground
with his Australian People’s Party, formed around May 1929. Hughes, however,
3 Form letter, 23 January 1930, by V. Goodin, Honourary Secretary Parliamentary Reform
Movement, Thomas Mutch Papers (hereafter Mutch Papers), MSS 426, Box 5, Mitchell Library,
Sydney; A. R. Crane and W. G. Walker, Peter Board: His Contribution to the Development of Education in
New South Wales (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1957), 4950; R.
Connell and T. Irving, Class Structure in Australian History: Documents, Narrative and Argument
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1980), 20206; D. Meredyth, ‘Invoking Citizenship: Education,
Competence and Social Rights’, Economy and Society 26, no. 2, (1997), 28789.
4 J. Roe, Beyond Belief: Theosophy in Australia 18791939 (Sydney: University of New South Wales
Press, 1986), 296309; Advance! Australia, 1 July 1927: 7; 16 July 1929: 2; 15 August 1929: 1; Who’s
for Australia League Rules and Regulations, A. E. Bennett, Presiding Councillor, Sydney, (1930?), rule
57; Who’s for Australia? (WFA), 1(1) (15 January 1930): 3; 1(4) (26 February 1930): 1; 1(8) (23
April 1930): 3; 1(10) (21 May 1930): 2; 2(3) (9 July 1930): 1; 2(6) (20 August 1930): 1; 1(2) (29
January 1930); 2(4) (23 July 1930): 1; 2(5) (6 August 1930): 5; 2(10) (15 October 1930): 1.
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had a genuine charismatic appeal with which Windeyer was unable to compete.
During the 1929 federal election campaign Windeyer’s party jumped on the
Hughes bandwagon, although Windeyer was much less committed than Hughes
to the defence of industrial arbitration, and was less hostile to the Nationalists.
Windeyer’s campaign focused on the comfortable generalities of opposition to
machine politics and support for constitutional reform.5 Lang’s landslide victory
in October 1930 was the highpoint of the left-wing tide, and its rapid ebb created
a mass constituency for a new centre politics.
The League emerged from panic-stricken discussions among business
leaders, who met in the milieu of the Sydney Rotary Club in the weeks after
Lang’s October 1930 victory. Until then political activity by business leaders took
two main forms: some were members of the Consultative Council, the
Nationalist’s secretive fundraising body, but business also financed ‘front’
groups, such as the Sane Democracy League (SDL), which sponsored speakers
and advertisements and placed newspaper letters.6 The new capitalist political
strategy was to form new front groups that were charged with the task of
seeking a broader membership than the SDL. The League was the best-known
group, but had two siblings: the Anti-Inflation League and the Producers’
Advisory Council. The first sank without a trace. The Advisory Council
leadership comprised representatives of leading business and farmer organisa-
tions and was closely linked to the paramilitary Old Guard. However, the
Council found that, in the battle for public support, it was outbid by Charles
Hardy’s Riverina movement. The League was formally launched on 12 February
1931, with its interim board dominated by employer-association office bearers,
many of whom were Rotarians or linked to the Old Guard. The interim president
Alexander Gibson was a Rotarian, engineer, and former wartime censor. It is
likely that the sponsors of the Advisory Council and the League saw these
organisations as complementary, but their decision to open up the League to
public membership led to a loss of control by the business elite.7
The League grew rapidly and claimed 160,000 members by the end of
March. At the first convention on 28 March, League members tore up the script
written by its business backers and asserted their independence. The convention
voted 598 to 40 to launch a political movement in opposition to the Nationalists.
Delegates shouted down known Nationalists and insisted their task was to save
Australia, not the Nationalists, and that ‘working men’ who had joined the
5 P. Westerway, ‘The Australian Party’, Government II Honours Essay, University of Sydney, 1957;
Sydney Morning Herald, 26 September 1929: 12; 2 October 1929: 12.
6 See correspondence between Secretary of North Broken Hill and its Sydney Agent, 16 January
1931; 14 January 1931; 17 February 1931; 12 March 1931; North Broken Hill Papers, Box 4, Item
6, University of Melbourne Archives.
7 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 December 1930: 11; 14 January 1931: 12; 17 January 1931: 12; Mathews,
‘The All for Australia League’, 138; B. Fletcher, Achieving For Others: The Rotary Club of Sydney 1921
2005 (Sydney: Rotary Club of Sydney, 2005), 25; A. Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier:
Conservative Paramilitary Organisations in New South Wales 193032 (Sydney: University of New South
Wales Press, 1989), 9293, 10507.
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League wanted it to keep separate from existing parties.8 This date marked the
rebirth of the League as a centre party rather than a business front group.
Nationalist sympathisers largely withdrew from the League and it came under
the control of a coalition of three elements: political amateurs such as Gibson,
ex-Labor rebels, and a group of businessmen alienated from the Nationalists,
particularly Charles Hoskins of Australian Iron and Steel, and the retailer
Sydney Snow. The first two groups were the staunchest defenders of the
League’s independence. Like the New Guard, the League was a populist revolt
against the conservative establishment.9
In the six months after March, the League’s grand aspirations deflated. It
became apparent that the Joseph Lyons’ emergence as federal non-Labor leader
did not mark a political revolution but merely a rebadging of the Nationalists.
The League reluctantly retreated from its initial aspirations to take over the
Nationalists or to effect a merger on equal terms. For a time the League insisted
on its political independence, but, in October and early November, the League
and the Nationalists reached agreement to form the state branch of the UAP.
Nationalist branches simply renamed themselves UAP branches and AFA
members joined as individuals. The founding convention of the UAP was
dominated in February 1932 by ex-Nationalists. When, in June 1932, the NSW
conservatives swept back to power, ex-AFA members were a tiny minority
among the victorious UAP members.10
All for Australia League policies
The key justification advanced by the League for its pursuit of political
independence was that its policies were different from those of the Nationalists.
It proposed a bureau of industrial cooperation, possibly constituted as a form of
‘industrial parliament’ that would boost industrial efficiency through the
encouragement of cooperation and profit-sharing in industry. An Economic
Advisory Council would consider the relation between finance, arbitration, and
tariff revision and develop a ‘scientific’ tariff. Activists saw the League as an
8 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February 1931; 910; 5 March 1931: 10; 16 March 1931: 6; 30 March
1931: 12. Presumably the League’s backers included the Sydney businessmen who, in December
1930, feared that Sir John Monash’s appointment to represent Australia at the Durbar for the
opening of New Delhi was a Labor government plot to get him out of the country. See Geoffrey
Serle, John Monash: A Biography (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1982), 519520.
9 For support of League independence from these groups, see R. Gillies to T. Mutch, 13 July 1931,
Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 70; A. J. Gibson, The All for Australia League: Its Real Significance (no
pagination, no publisher, c.1931); Sydney Morning Herald, 7 June 1931: 5; 24 March 1931: 13; 10
April 1931: 10; 10 July 1931: 12; 22 July 1931: 12 (Mutch); 1 August 1931: 5 (Bennett); 19
August 1931: 12; The Sun, 15 August 1931: 7 (R. T. Gillies, ex-Labor MP); 22 October 1931: 19.
10 Memo to branches from National Association, 12 January 1932; Unity Negotiations, John Latham
Papers (hereafter Latham Papers), Series 51, MSS 1009, National Library of Australia (hereafter
NLA), Canberra.
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educational body; it organised speakers on topics such as property voting, social
credit, and democratic ideals.11
Behind the League’s advocacy of consensus lay a theory of political division
drawn from James Bryce’s analysis of the American party system. League
publicists cited Bryce to argue that American parties reflected vertical opinion
cleavages rather than the horizontal class cleavages represented by Australian
parties. The Australian class system was a cause and effect of political divisions,
as those who led the existing parties benefited from the encouragement of class
division. Political divisions, Peter Board argued, should be based on broad
traditions, rather than specific policies, and parties should allow their members
to freely dissent on means to shared ends. Years later, Mutch mused that politics
should be about commitment and belief rather than blind loyalty and self-
interest, and declared that he could never support a cause in which he did not
wholly believe.12
To overcome class divisions, the League emphasised changes in individual
attitudes rather than social reform. Here it echoed the attitude of business
Rotarians. They had argued that personal contact and respect needed to be re-
established in industry: employers should demonstrate leadership, not auto-
cracy, and show concern for their subordinates. This emphasis on responsibility
applied to workers and management. If workers were to participate in industry,
they should change their attitudes. Rotarians supported profit-sharing and co-
partnership, but also feared that these incentives relied on individual selfishness.
Like Theosophists, many Rotarians feared that arbitration encouraged class
conflict. In this perspective the role of government was not to reconcile
competing interests, but rather to make the warring parties aware that their
interests were actually not in competition. 13
League activists were most inspired by the prospect of political reforms; these
were simpler than the divisive topics of tariffs and public finance. The conservative
views of the League on vital economic policy issues, such as budgetary balance,
the sanctity of contract and trade union power, meant that they needed to find
11 All for Australia League (AFA), Policy as Adopted by Convention of the League, 8 August 1931, The
League, Sydney, 45, 10, 12, 17, 20; Draft, AFA and tariff in Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 70;
Warby to Mutch, 11 September 1931; Circular to AFA speakers, 12 August 1931; Memo to AFA,
speakers 11 September 1931; Circular to AFA speakers, 12 August 1931; Mutch, 23 May 1931 and
9 September 1931; Circular to AFA speakers, 12 August 1931; H. Warby (Organising Secretary
AFA) to Mutch, 23 May 1931 and 9 September 1931; Circular to AFA speakers, 12 August 1931 in
Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 50; AFA Flyer Public Meeting on Policy, 6 August 1931 in Mutch
Papers, MSS 426, Box 62.
12 A. E. Bennett, ‘Evils of Machine Politics’, Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 50; P. Board, ‘Party Spirit
in Politics’, Australian Quarterly, vol. 3 (1931): 6569; Mutch to H. and E. Nagle, 2 June 1944, in
Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 15B.
13 W. Clegg, ‘Rotary in Relation to Industry’, The Pinion 1(6) (1928): 9; J. McIntyre, ‘Class Conflict’,
The Pinion 1(12) (1931): 15; N. Keysor, ‘The Middle of the Industrial Road’, The Pinion 5(2): 1112;
J. Heyworth, ‘Vocational Service’, The Pinion 1(9) (1929): 1011; J. Heyworth ‘Vocational Service’,
The Pinion 1(9), (1929): 1011. A. Robinson, ‘Personal Touch in Industry’, The Pinion, 2(7), (1929):
44; S. Pascall, ‘Talk on Industry’, The Pinion 3(1), (1932): 19; F. de W. Batty, ‘Industrial Relations’,
The Pinion 3(1), (1932): 19; H. G. Murray, ‘Payment For Labour by Results’, The Pinion 3(3)
(1932): 7; Mitchell, Rotary Club, 5861; Advance! Australia, 12 September 1929: 5.
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points of differentiation from the Nationalists, and condemnation of Nationalist
‘machine politics’ was a key League theme. According to the League, elective
ministries (probably inspired by Bryce’s description of the Swiss system), multiple
endorsements of candidates, initiative and recall, and proportional representation
would reduce the influence of class on politics. 14
The League’s emphasis on political reform established a point of similarity
with Hardy’s Riverina movement. Hardy’s movement won support in the
country that would have otherwise gone to the League, whose few early rural
meetings were poorly attended. Hardy addressed the first AFA convention; his
movement shared its concern for political reform and its appeal to ‘moderate
labour’. Hardy’s message was simpler than that of the Advisory Council and the
Country Party. Farmers might have been receptive to a free-trade crusade or a
defence of the particularist claims of the Country Party, but they were a minority
of rural electors.15
The social basis of League support
League activists were not the dupes of business conservatism or representatives of
a panic-stricken petty-bourgeoisie. Judith Brett has stressed Lyons’ personal
appeal and his skill in the enunciation of middle-class understandings of finance,
but she overstates the importance of both of these to the citizens’ movements.
Once Lyons descended from the political heaven of early 1931 to become the
leader of an earthly political party, his appeal ebbed. The League resisted Lyons’
persistent appeals for cooperation with the Nationalists. After the initial wave of
enthusiasm in the early months of 1931, the League’s membership fell away
rapidly, but those who remained were loyal to the centre party project until the
sudden capitulation of the League in November 1931. There was little support
from League branches for an unequal fusion with the Nationalists. Here the
League’s experience resembled that of Hughes’ Australian Party in 1930. Hughes’
anti-Nationalist and generally pro-Labor position during 1930 inspired a torrent of
media hostility and some defections, such as Richard Windeyer, but most members
remained loyal to Hughes.16
14 Sydney Morning Herald, 11 August 1931: 10; AFA, Policy: 45, 10, 12, 17, 20, 23; AFA Draft
Constitution and final Constitution in Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 68; J. Bryce, Modern
Democracies, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1921), 520.
15 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 April 1931: 13 (Hardy); 22 May 1931: 10; 1 June 1931: 10; Sergeant G.
Ferguson, Sergeant to Metropolitan Superintendent of Police, 17 March 1931, ‘Report on 14
March Riverina movement convention in Wagga’, 15, and ‘Transcript of Riverina movement
Albury meeting 27 March 1931’, 24, 10, in Colonial Secretary Correspondence, 5/8999, Item
B1924, State Records of NSW.
16 R. Gillies to Mutch, 13 July 1931, in Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 70; memo to secretaries of
subdivisions, 19 June 1931, 14 July 1931; ‘Details of Plan for Financing the League’, in Mutch
Papers, MSS 426, Box 68; AFA State Executive Agenda, 17 June 1931 in Mutch Papers, MSS 426,
Box 70; Agenda, State Council, 22 July 1931, Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 70; AFA Agenda State
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When historians have considered public opinion in this period they have
focused on the issue of ‘sound finance’ and evoked the image of a panic-stricken
‘middle class’. The importance of this issue has been overstated. Foreign debt
repudiation was unpopular, but voters were more ambivalent on budget deficits.
During the October 1930 state election campaign, the Coalition campaigned
almost entirely on allegiance to the Melbourne agreement of August 1930,
whereby state governments pledged to balance their budgets, but the Coalition
suffered a landslide defeat.17
In early 1931, criticism of ‘inflation’ did briefly become a central theme of
Labor’s critics. Labor was accused of planning to finance government expendi-
ture by resorting to the printing press on the model of Germany in the early
1920s.18 Popular understanding of monetary policy tended to identify money
solely with bank notes. David Pope’s analysis found that from 1901 to 1930,
inflationary expectations were not a significant predictor of inflation levels
(unlike the 1970s); voters seem to have viewed inflationary episodes as
aberrations, and this could have encouraged a fear that inflation could occur
at any time, whether due to greedy profiteers or an expansion of the money
supply. The Nationalist landslide in the February 1931 Parkes by-election does
suggest a popular fear of fiscal experimentation, but this fear was narrowly
restricted to the twin spectres of debt repudiation and uncontrolled inflation
resulting from extravagant printing of banknotes.19 When Lang sought to
legislate for interest rate reductions in April 1931, NSW conservatives eschewed
arguments on the basis of sanctity of contract, and argued on pragmatic grounds
that the legislation would discourage investment. Fear of financial collapse was
not restricted to a frightened middle-class; when John Latham complained to
the business elite of the National Union that Lyons’ policy on tariffs and
arbitration was unclear, ‘they said this was unimportant compared to finance’.
The director of a manufacturing company commented later: ‘The winter of 1931
saw things at very low ebb . . . Default, also inflation was feared. All shares
fell.’20
Fear of wage reductions and unemployment was probably a more significant
driver of electoral behaviour across the Depression years. In 192930, Labor
benefited from popular opposition to wage reductions, and support for the
Council 6 July 1931, (notes from State Council 6 July 1931), Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 68; P.
Peter, ‘Social Aspects of the Depression in New South Wales 192834’ (PhD thesis, Australian
National University, 1964), 299n3; G. Robinson, ‘1930’, in M. Hogan & D. Clune, eds, The People’s
Choice: Electoral Politics in Twentieth Century New South Wales, vol. 2, 1930 to 1965, (Sydney:
University of Sydney & Parliament of NSW, 2001), 21.
17 Brett, Moral Middle Class, 94100; Cochrane, Industrialization and Dependence, 12627; Robinson,
‘1930’, 2728.
18 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 January 1931: 17.
19 D. Pope, ‘Price Expectations and the Australian Price Level: 190130’, Economic Record, vol. 56
(1981); Brett, Moral Middle Class, 11012; Cochrane, Industrialization and Dependence, 12630.
20 J. G. Latham, Notes made on 6 April 1931, in Latham Papers, MSS 1009, Series 49; Director’s
Meetings 190345, Notes by S. G. Garnsworthy, S. G. Garnsworthy Diaries 190362, MLK 4408,
Australian Glass Manufacturers, Australian Consolidated Industries, MSS 5146, Mitchell Library,
Sydney.
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maintenance of federal arbitration. Labor won over white-collar employees and
working-class Protestant conservatives. In 193132, the fears of voters probably
shifted to the spectre of unemployment, while at the same time the
conservatives had reversed their position on arbitration and pledged to accept
the electors’ verdict given in 1929. Many workers now accepted wage
reductions to maintain employment. Enterprise loyalty supplanted class loyalty.
The cultural factors that Brett emphasises are crucial to the long-term
explanation of Australian electoral behaviour, but short-term fluctuations in
electoral support reflected voter responses to political events, such as the
Coalition’s rightward lurch in 192830, the economic collapse, and Labor’s
disarray. As in Germany at the same time, extraordinary political upheavals
were the result of ordinary economic voting. Brett’s downplaying of the
substantive issues of national policy that were responsible for the Nationalist
defeat in 1929, in favour of an emphasis on personalities and political rhetoric, is
echoed by contemporary economic liberals in their interpretation of the 1929
election, as they are keen to deny industrial relations was an election issue in
1929.21
Historians committed to class analysis have tended to argue that the
dissident right, such as the League, Hughes’ supporters, or the New Guard,
represented economically and socially marginal sections of capital, such as small
employers or manufacturers. This reverses the actual line of causation. Centrist
political forces such as Billy Hughes’ followers or Labor moderates were able to
appeal for support from manufacturers, fearful of Labor radicals and the free-
trade right, but these centrist forces were not called into existence by
manufacturers.22 Only three of the twenty-five members of the League
executive were linked to manufacturing. The NSW Chamber of Manufactures
president H. Gordon Bennett, brother of A. E. Bennett, was on the League
executive. But Gordon was more an aspirant politician than businessman; he
was a former clerk, war hero, and confidant of Hughes. Gordon had been
recruited by the Chamber as an attractive public face. Bennett’s enthusiasm for
the League probably owed much to his qualities of frustrated ambition, supreme
self-confidence, and short temper, which led him in 1942 to condemn the ‘effete
conservatism’ of the British Army.23
21 For Labor advertisements, see Sydney Morning Herald, 10 October 1929: 12; 11 October 1929: 8; The
Australian Banker, vol. 4, no. 10 (1929): 1; vol. 6, no. 10 (1931): 4; vol. 7, no. 1 (1932), 2; G. King,
O. Rosen, M. Tanner and A. Wagner, ‘Ordinary Economic Voting in the Extraordinary Election of
Adolf Hitler’ (2004), Bhttp://gking.harvard.edu/preprints.shtml, accessed 10 September 2004;
G. Henderson, ‘Media Missing Bennelong Point’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 2007; A.
Wood, ‘Defeat Would Owe More To Timing Than IR Anger’, The Australian, 12 September 2007.
22 T. Matthews, ‘Business Associations and Politics: Chambers of Manufacturers and Employers’
Federations in New South Wales, Victorian and Australian National Politics to 1939’ (PhD thesis,
University of Sydney, 1971), 359.
23 A. Moore, Francis De Groot: Irish Fascist, Australian Legend (Sydney: Federation Press, 2005), 6771;
Cochrane, Industrialization and Dependence, 11618; ‘The AFA League and the Tariff’ in Mutch
Papers, MSS 426, Box 50; F. Legg, The Gordon Bennett Story (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1965), 7,
140, 142, 145, 148; D. Horner, High Command: Australia’s Struggle For an Independent War Strategy,
193945 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1982), 171.
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Tariff levels were keenly debated in the 1930s. Proponents of the class-
analysis approach, such as Les Louis and Peter Cochrane, have identified a
conflict between a finance-pastoral nexus linked to Britain and a nascent
national bourgeoisie around manufacturing. The journal often cited as the voice
of small manufacturing capital is the Australian Manufacturer. This had been
established as a private venture in 1916 by some members of the Chamber of
Manufactures. The supporters of the journal shared a particular interest in
industrial efficiency. The pages of this journal are scoured by some historians for
hints of under-consumptionist opposition to wage reductions and scepticism
about banks.24 But the Australian Manufacturer was a personal project of its
owners; the Chamber had only two official pages in each issue. In 1931, the
Chamber withdrew support from the Australian Manufacturer and established its
own Bulletin, which ignored the broader concerns of the Australian Manufacturer.
The Chamber had to market itself to potential members, whose concern was
now economic survival and opposition to Lang’s radical industrial program. The
political trajectory of manufacturers in the early 1930s bore some resemblance
to that of the 1980s and 1990s. In the late twentieth century the Metal Trades
Industry Association initially defended the Accord and centralised wage-
fixation, but its members faced increasing competitive pressures due to
economic liberalisation. The Association finally reversed its position in the early
1990s and came out in support of enterprise bargaining. In 1932, the New South
Wales Chamber of Manufactures coordinated a massive campaign at the
enterprise level to urge workers to vote against Lang. Political polarisation
ended any prospect of an alliance between Labor moderates and manufacturers
in the early 1930s. Sixty years later, globalisation ended the alliance between
workers and the national bourgeoisie.25
Political class fractions do not simply reflect economic interests, and the
League leadership is a classic example of a political coterie constructed out of
ideological enthusiasms and shared antipathies. Those capitalists involved in the
League did not represent distinct sectoral interests. In 192930, many business-
men were concerned by the political ineffectiveness of the Nationalists, but it
was probably personality conflicts that impelled a few to further action. Central
here was the role of Archdale Parkhill, federal MP for Warringah from 1928.
Parkhill had served as head of the party organisation for the Nationalists and
their predecessors from 1904 to 1928. Parkhill was rare among conservatives; he
was a proud professional machine politician and contemptuous of political
amateurs such as the League. If A. E. Bennett, Gibson, and Mutch were political
24 C. Hall, The Manufacturers: Australian Manufacturing Achievements to 1960 (Sydney: Angus &
Robertson, 1971), 42627; L. Louis, Trade Unions and the Depression: A Study of Victoria, 193032
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968), 46; Cochrane, Industrialization and
Dependence, 116.
25 Hall, The Manufacturers, 42627; Manufacturers’ Bulletin, vol. 1, no.1, 1 September 1930; vol. 1, no.
4, 1 December 1930; vol. 1, no. 7, 10 March 1931; vol. 1, no. 12, 15 June 1931; vol. 2, no. 14, 21
May 1932; P. Sheldon and L. Thornwaite, ‘The Metal Trades Industry Association’, in eds P.
Sheldon and L. Thornwaite, Employer Associations and Industrial Relations Change: Catalysts or
Captives? (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 7093.
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entrepreneurs, Parkhill was the manager of an established monopoly concern.
The State Nationalist leader Thomas Bavin was close to Parkhill and saw
criticism of politicians by the League as a personal affront. Leading businessmen
found that Bavin was unwilling to accept their advice on Parkhill’s unpopular-
ity.26 The Nationalists’ organisational wing perhaps exercised more influence
over MPs in NSW than in other states. Some parliamentarians and deputy
federal UAP leader John Latham had concerns about its position of total hostility
to the League.27
It is not surprising that there were at least two businessmen willing to carry
their dislike of the Nationalist machine to the level of financing and supporting
the League as an alternative to the Nationalists. Neither Snow nor Hoskins were
marginal economic figures, but they had a particular interest in unseating Lang.
Labor support for compulsory unionism and opposition to work-sharing (wide-
spread in retail industry) posed novel challenges to managerial prerogative. The
League’s emphasis on class harmony was consistent with the welfarist
enthusiasms of some retailers, and this welfarism (like the League’s quest for
class harmony) did not imply any erosion of managerial prerogative. On the
limited evidence available, it was retailers, corralled by Snow, who made more
contributions to the League than small manufacturers.28 We know a little more
about Hoskins’s personal motives. Australian Iron & Steel was a family company,
under financial pressure due to obsolete machinery and an over-reliance on
government contracts, and keen to attract British investment. In his managerial
role, Hoskins had a reputation for hasty and ill-thought action. By late 1931, the
League’s declining membership made it more dependent on business support
than it had been earlier in 1931. Snow and Hoskins were the first among the
League leadership to concede defeat and recognise the inevitability of a merger
on the Nationalists’ terms, and they used their financial influence in the League
to this end.29
Apart from Snow and Hoskins, the political entrepreneurs of the League
came from a social network that resembles that of later centre parties such as the
Australian Democrats and the British Social Democrats. Themes of progressi-
vism, progress, and social harmony were central and these originated with the
despair of many liberal intellectuals during World War I with Labor’s perceived
indifference to questions of productivity and national defence. A central figure
26 K. Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, in K. Marx, Surveys From Exile
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 157; J. T. Latham, notes made on 6 April 1931; Latham to T.
Bavin, 21 April 1931; Statement by Latham, 24 April 1931, in Latham Papers, MSS 1009, Series
49.
27 Sydney Morning Herald, 10 September 1931: 9; Latham to Bavin, 20 January 1932; Horsfield to
Latham, 22 March 1932, in Latham Papers, MSS 1009, Series 51.
28 B. Pragnell, ‘‘‘Selling Consent’’: From Authoritarianism to Welfarism at David Jones, 18381958’
(PhD thesis, University of New South Wales, 2001), 25051. Peter, ‘Social Condition’, 284 n 6, 299
n 1.
29 E. M. Johnston-Lik, G. Lik and R. G. Ward, A Measure of Greatness: The Origins of the Australian Iron
and Steel Industry (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1998), 281, 290, 29597, 302, 316;
Matthews, ‘All for Australia League’, 145.
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was pioneer industrial psychologist Bernard Muscio. In 1917, Muscio argued
that psychology was essential to genuine scientific management. Muscio
admitted that the introduction of scientific management to enterprises would
inevitably undermine collective bargaining and unionism. His alternative was
‘industrial democracy’, but for Muscio this was little more than a commitment
towards the careful explanation and fair implementation of managerial
prerogative. Muscio’s own approach resembled that of contemporary enligh-
tened capitalist proponents of Human Resource Management such as the Metal
Trades Industry Association’s Heather Ridout. In Muscio’s view, personal
maladjustment was a major driver of class conflict. Vocational guidance would
reduce class conflict and increase human freedom as it enabled individuals to
make informed choices about their future.30 This interest in control matched the
broader progressive interest in the rationalisation of social life. Frank Edwards,
secretary both of the Australian Institute of Industrial Psychology (formed in
1927) and of the Chamber of Manufacturers, complained that parents made
insufficient use of psychology in the guidance of children. Edwards, like Mutch
and Bennett, was another political seeker, a former Labor candidate and private
secretary to William Holman, who had followed him out of Labor. In 1935, the
former AFA president Alexander Gibson concluded that technological develop-
ment meant that the ‘great body of men in industry . . . will be called upon less
and less for independent thinking’.31 Rotarians supported vocational guidance,
as did Mutch who, as Public Instruction Minister, presided over the establish-
ment of a Vocational Guidance Bureau. Muscio died in 1925, but his widow, the
feminist Mildred Muscio, was a founding member of the Institute of Industrial
Psychology. Tasman Lovell, a Muscio prote´ge´ and the first Professor of
Psychology at the University of Sydney, also became active in the League.
Lovell argued that politicians should adopt the sporting values of Head of the
River contestants.32
30 H. Ridout, ‘‘‘A Fair Go All Round’’: Workplace Relations in the Twenty-First Century’, Journal of
Industrial Relations, vol. 47 (2005): 22641; J. Warhurst, ‘1977: Don Chipp’s New Party’, in ed. J.
Warhurst, Keeping the Bastards Honest: The Australian Democrats’ First Twenty Years (Sydney: Allen &
Unwin, 1997), 5456; I. Crewe and A. King, SDP: The Birth, Life and Death of the Social Democratic
Party (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 9496; T. Rowse, Australian Liberalism and National
Character (Melbourne: Kibble Books, 1978), 5860; B. Muscio, Lectures on Industrial Psychology
(Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1917), 56, 26, 3744, 10407, 259, 15765, 232, 240, 24447,
274n76.
31 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 September 1929: 7; Hall, The Manufacturers, 25667; Technical
Education Commission, Report on the Technical Education System of New South Wales, New South Wales
Parliamentary Papers, 1935/36, vol. 1, Reference B, 36; Reference C, 32.
32 Fletcher, Achieving For Others, 34; W. M. O’Neil, ‘Muscio, Bernard (18871926)’, M. Foley and G.
Fullon, ‘Muscio, Florence Mildred (18821964)’, in eds B. Nairn and G. Serle, Australian Dictionary
of Biography, vol. 10, 18911939 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1986), 651; M. Foley,
‘The Women’s Movement in New South Wales and Victoria, 19181938’ (PhD thesis, University
of Sydney, 1985), 35660; W. M. O’Neill, ‘Lovell, Henry Tasman (18781958)’, in Nairn and Serle,
Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 10, 156; on Lovell’s AFA activities, see ‘List of AFA sub-
committees’, 2 June 1931; The Hunter Statesman. AFA Hunter Division, 2 July 1931, in Mutch
Papers, MSS 426, Box 58.
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Industrial psychologists were frustrated by the limited attention that they
received from the business community.33 Their proposals, however, were largely
irrelevant to most Australian employers, most of whom were owner-managers
who relied on direct control by foremen and the threat of dismissal to induce
worker obedience. Some larger enterprises flirted with welfarism and employee
participation, but interest in these declined from the late 1920s as unemploy-
ment provided a ready disciplinary tool. Secure within the frameworks of
industrial arbitration, Australian workers were less prone to the type of
spontaneous mobilisations that impelled anxious American employers to seek
the advice of academic experts. Journals, such as Australian Manufacturer and
Rotary’s The Pinion, provided a minority of Australian capitalists with an outlet
for musing on social questions. But when Paul Harris, the founder of Rotary,
visited Australia in 1935, he commented that the ‘intellectual side’ of Rotary had
little appeal. It was much easier to gain support among Rotarians for charity
projects than for more ambitious schemes of social reform or investigation.34
The academic popularity of industrial psychology, with its emphasis on the
maladjustment of the individual, was an aspect of a broader mood of anti-
democratic disillusion. In 1920, Bryce identified a conflict between the popular
sentiment of natural equality and the ‘stubborn fact’ of natural inequality.
Alfred Martin, another 1920s industrial psychologist, believed that class
positions often reflected innate differences in intelligence. In 1927, Vern Goodin,
a former Labor MP, teacher and opponent of Lang, complained that Lang’s union
allies ignored the different abilities of workers and sought to drag all workers
down to the level of the basic wage. Lovell complained that labour was
suspicious of the Institute of Industrial Psychology ‘as it was of everything else
that had as its object the encouragement of individual effort’.35
As the League defined itself in opposition to the Nationalists after April
1931, it became more involved with feminism, a key component of the
progressivist and centre politics milieu. Like the Australian Democrats, the
League began as the vehicle of charismatic males such as Gibson, but then
gained support from feminists. At first feminists questioned the League; they
pointed to the absence of women on its executive, together with the spectre
of ‘civil disturbance’ called up by the public wearing of League badges.
However, female participation in the League developed quickly after the March
33 K. Blackburn, ‘The Quest for Efficiency and the Rise of Industrial Psychology in Australia, 1916
29’, Labour History, no. 74 (1998): 122136; Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 1929: 16; 4 January
1929: 15; 17 September 1929: 11.
34 J. McMartin, Labor’s Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern
American Labor Relations, 19121921 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); C.
Wright, The Management of Labour: A History of Australian Employers (Melbourne: Oxford University
Press, 1995), 1435; Rowse, Liberalism, 67; Fletcher, Achieving for Others, 47, 61.
35 J. Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol. 1, (London: Macmillan, 1920), 74; Sydney Morning Herald, 31
August 1927: 12 (Martin); 11 August 1927: 11 (Goodin); 14 August 1929: 16 (Lovell).
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convention. A woman’s auxiliary committee was established and Mildred
Muscio became a member of the Executive by July. 36
In the final days of the League the role of women become a subject of
debate. In the run-up to the March 1932 founding convention of the UAP,
Gibson encouraged female AFA members to seek election to the convention. But
at the convention ex-Nationalists ran a successful ticket to maximise their
representation on the UAP council. League members proposed that the new
party not preselect a single candidate for each electorate but allow any member
to nominate, but this key demand was defeated. Against feminist opposition the
convention resolved that, where separate women’s branches existed, women
could not join any other branch except as associates. After the convention a
group of Nationalist women complained that the ex-Nationalist ticket had been
unfair to the League and demanded that more former AFA members be co-opted
to the UAP council.37
Seeking ‘Sane Labour’
The League argued that existing parties were dominated by extremist ‘reds’ and
‘reactionary Tories’ and only the League could unite the ‘great majority’ of ‘sane
labour’ with ‘business and producing interests’. It insisted that ‘moderate labour’
voters would not support the Nationalists. The League was certainly correct to
believe that the non-Labor parties required the support of manual workers to
achieve a majority. Analysis of the 1933 census suggests that a clear majority of
NSW electors were either current or past manual workers, or their dependents.
White-collar workers, employers, and the self-employed together were too few
to account alone for the electoral upheavals of 192832. Ecological regression
analysis suggests major fluctuations in Labor support among manual workers.38
Until their rightward lurch in 192830, the Nationalists had attracted significant
support from manual workers.
In the 1950s, fears of communism impelled the desertion of many Catholics
from Labor. The League briefly attracted the sympathetic interest of a few
36 M. Lake, Getting Equal: The History of Australian Feminism (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 13963;
United Associations of Women, Executive, 26 March 1931, 2 April 1931, 16 April 1931, in United
Associations of Women Papers, Box Y74477, MSS 2160, Mitchell Library, Sydney; H. G. Bennett,
Convener of Women’s Committee of State Council to all-women’s organisations in Sydney, 11
June 1931; memo to Women’s Auxiliary Committee and Women Speakers 11 June 1931; list of
AFA sub-committees, 2 June 1931 in Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 70; Sydney Morning Herald, 10
July 1931: 5, 13.
37 Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April 1932: 910; 2 April 1932: 4; 4 April 1932: 4; 7 April 1932: 9;
Australian National Review, 23 April 1932: 715.
38 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February 1931: 8 (Gibson); 30 March 1931: 12 (H. G. Bennett); 17 April
1931: 12 (Gibson); The Sun, 31 March 1931: 11 (Gibson); 4 April 1931: 7; ‘AFA League: Unity
Question’, ‘The Financial Record of Party Politics’, AFA Folder in Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 68;
G. Robinson, ‘‘‘We Must Fight on Every Front’’: Class Mobilisation and Electoral Outcomes in New
South Wales 192832’, Social Science History Association Conference, Portland, Oregon, 36
November 2005, 19 at Bhttp://geoffrobinson.info/9.html, accessed 1 October 2007.
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Catholics who were fearful of Lang’s radicalism. However, moderate Catholics
had an alternative to Lang in the form of the anti-Lang Federal Labor Party. In
NSW, Federal Labor took on some of the features of a centre party. With the
demise of the League, some members moved across to Federal Labor as an
alternative centre party, such as pioneer political scientist and later Liberal
senator J. A. MacCallum.39
Protestant workers attracted most interest from centre party proponents.
Some Protestant activists had argued before 1914 that the non-Labor parties
needed a positive program of social reform to win back Protestant workers from
Labor. Many of these workers did desert Labor in the state and federal elections
of 1917, but subsequently drifted back to Labor. Some of the anti-Lang Labor
rebels received the support of Protestant organisations in 1927 and 1930. Mutch
was a Mason. 40
The leading proponents of a centre politics based on an appeal to Protestant
workers were those associated with the loyalist unions in the railways that had
been founded after the 1917 general strike to represent strike-breakers. In 1922,
the station master William Skelton was elected as an independent MP for
Newcastle and, in 1925, he led a ‘Protestant Independent Labor Party’. Skelton’s
parliamentary career ended at the 1927 election. That year proportional
representation was abolished for New South Wales elections. Skelton remained
active in the loyalist Railway Service Association. From August 1930, Who’s for
Australia? carried contributions by Association office bearers, which appealed for
railway workers to join the League.41
In Newcastle the League probably inherited some of Skeleton’s support. The
Nationalists, and later the UAP, were particularly weak in the Hunter region and
did not contest most interwar federal elections. In the local AFA journal Ernest
Burgmann argued for a middle way between individualism and collectivism,
and a peaceful transition to a new industrial society. Newcastle League activists
were desperate to challenge the entrenched local Labor hegemony. They were
the last to desert the original project of the League as a centre party.42
The major difficulty that the League faced in its appeal to conservative,
particularly Protestant, workers was competition from the New Guard and from
the rebadged ex-Nationalists of the UAP. Most conservative workers displayed a
deferential abstention from political activism and in 193032 the UAP’s
39 Catholic Press, 2 July 1931: 21; 16 July 1931: 21; W. Hancock, ‘England and Australia: A Study in
Democratic Development’, in W. K. Hancock, Politics in Pitcairn and Other Essays (London:
Macmillan, 1947), 66; Peter, ‘Social Aspects’, 295n2, 299n3.
40 J. Rydon, R. Spann and H. Nelson, New South Wales Politics, 19011917: An Electoral and Political
Chronicle (Sydney: Department of Government, University of Sydney, 1996), 51, 58, 93; I. Young,
‘Catholics and the New South Wales Labor Party, 191939’, Australasian Political Studies Association
News, vol. 6 (1931): 7; A. C. Seddon (Protestant Alliance Friendly Society) to Mutch, 18
September 1930 in Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 1.
41 WFA, 2(6) (20 August 1930): 3.
42 S. Gray, ‘Social Aspects of the Depression in Newcastle’ (MA, University of Newcastle, 1981), 126
34. United Australia Party, Third Annual General Convention. Report of the Council [1935], 1; The
Hunter Statesman. AFA Hunter Division, 2 July 1931 in Mutch Papers, MSS 426, Box 58.
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commitment to the protection of industrial arbitration, high tariffs, and the
reassuring personality of Lyons, won back those conservative workers who had
strayed. Indeed, the pro-Nationalist swings at federal by-elections in early 1931
showed that even then the Nationalists had regained the support of many who
deserted them in 192930. A smaller but vociferous group of conservative
workers were young men, often war veterans, such as those engaged in anti-
foreigner campaigns in mining areas.43 But the genteel centrism of the League
had little to offer these workers. The New Guard was more attractive. The
Railway Service Association was sympathetic to the Guard. Australian fascism in
the form of the New Guard was notably less working-class than in Europe, but
as in Europe many fascist street fighters were male manual workers.44
Hegemony and adaptation
Whatever the internal deficiencies of the League, its failure cannot be explained
without a consideration of its rivals. In 192930, the mainstream conservatives
were in crisis. There was widespread disillusionment within the Country Party
with the fruits of coalition, whilst the Nationalists had suffered major electoral
reversals. In Germany at this time, the Nazis smashed the electoral base of the
mainstream liberal and conservative parties. The commitment of these parties to
a deflationary policy orthodoxy cost them electoral support.
The League failed because Australian conservatives regrouped and moved
back towards the centre. Lyons was important, less because of his personal
charisma than as a symbol of this movement. Those who backed Lyons’
ascension to national leadership, such as Menzies, had earlier been supporters of
the Nationalists’ 192829 shift to the right.45
The League activists did not make Lyons UAP leader. Nor did his rise
demonstrate a victory of the middle class within the conservative ranks. Small
manufacturers and farmers were mostly politically inept and narrowly self-
interested; they were unable to fulfil the requirements of hegemonic class
leadership, that is the sacrifice of aspects of their own material interest in the
interests of hegemonic leadership.46 The League was not the vehicle of
manufacturers; rather, centrist politicians tapped industrial capitalists for
financial support by evoking the twin spectres of Labor radicalism and free-
trade conservatives. In NSW it was the Graziers’ Association’s Frederick Tout
who worked tirelessly so as to maintain the unity of the right. He played a
43 L. Tanner, ‘Working Class Politics and Culture: A Case Study of Brunswick in the 1920s’ (MA,
University of Melbourne, 1984), 120. J. McCalman, Struggletown: Private and Public Life in Richmond
19001965 (Melbourne: Hyland House, 1998), 20001; S. Gregson, ’Foot Soldiers for Capital: The
Influence of RSL Racism on Interwar Industrial Relations in Kalgoorlie and Broken Hill’ (PhD,
University of New South Wales, 2003).
44 A. Moore, ‘The New Guard and the Labour Movement, 193135’, Labour History 89 (2005): 56.
45 A. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, vol. 1, 18941943 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press,
1996), 8990, 9599.
46 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International, 1971), 193.
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leading role in the formation of the Australian Overseas Transport Association in
1929 to manage producer discontent with high shipping rates and to maintain
the alliance of pastoral and mercantile capital.47 Within the NSW Country Party,
it was the Graziers’ Association leadership and the Party’s parliamentarians that
fought to steer the party towards the pragmatic centre-right, to accept the need
for coalition with the Nationalists and that concessions had to be made to urban
working-class voters to keep Labor from government. It was smaller farmers, not
graziers, who were the hard right of the Country Party.48 Tout chaired the final
discussions between the League, the Nationalists, the Country Party, and the
Producers’ Advisory Council in November 1931 that led to agreement on merger
of the Nationalists and the League. As Kosmos Tsokhas has argued, pastoral
capitalists such as Tout sacrificed their own short-term interests to preserve a
united anti-Labor front and to appease volatile electoral constituencies such as
small farmers dependent on the British market. 49
Conclusion
The League posed a major challenge to the established conservative parties. The
activist leadership of the League was inspired not by concerns about ‘sound
finance’ or a personal devotion to Lyons, but by a vision of a transformed
political system. For a time their cause seemed unstoppable, but they were
undercut by ability of the dominant class fractions to reconstitute the political
unity of the right and mount an effective appeal to working-class voters. The
League’s enthusiasts resembled the fellow-travellers of early European fascism,
who found that their dreams of a corporatist third-way counted for little once
fascism advanced to political power. As in Europe, the failure of these dreams
was preordained by the fundamental commitment of League activists to the
maintenance of capitalist property relations.50
47 G. Robinson, ‘The Political Economy of Maritime Industry Non-Reform in Interwar Australia: The
Establishment of the Maritime Services Board of New South Wales’, Eras: Monash Historical
Journal, No. 4 (2003), at Bhttp://www.arts.monash.edu.au/eras/edition_4/robinson.htm,
accessed 1 October 2007.
48 B. D. Graham, The Formation of the Australian Country Parties (Canberra: Australian National
University Press, 1966), 27778; comments of Country Party candidates, Minutes of Country
Party Central Council, 19 November 1930, vol. 5 (Sydney: Country Party of New South Wales
Papers, National Party of New South Wales); Farmers & Settlers’ Association, Proceedings of the 37th
Annual Conference (1930) (Sydney, 1930): 1920 (presidential address), 90 (Buttenshaw MP);
Farmers and Settlers’ Association, Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference (1931) (Sydney, 1931),
54.
49 Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October 1931: 11; 15 October 1931: 9; 17 October 1931: 13; 22 October
1931: 9; K. Tsokhas, Conflicts, Compromises and Interests: Grazier Organizations and the Political
Economy of the United Australia Party (Canberra: Australian National University, Working Paper in
Economic History, no. 112, 1988).
50 R. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (London: Allen Lane, 2004); D. Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition
and Italian Fascism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).
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